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ALBANIA: LANDMARKS OF TRANSITION 
 





In late October 2003, an IMIR research team carried out a follow-up field study in 
Albania1. It continued the topic of “Albanian Communities in the Balkans” elaborated during the 
last few years. Applied was the “urgent anthropology” method including various techniques of 
quick collection and analysis of data: anthropological enquiries and observations, adapted semi-
standardised sociological interviews, statistical data, and scholarly experts’ opinion. The aim of 
the study was to take a snapshot of the situation in this country. The team’s efforts were focused 
on getting a deeper insight into the political and economic processes, the specific cultural and 
ethnographic characteristics of the population, the discrepancy between the North and the South, 
the processes of migration, the family, and the different minorities. 
   Within the span of four years, it was the second field study conducted in Albania. Because 
of the still unstable situation there, during the 1999 expedition the researchers failed to fulfil the 
team’s initial intentions to carry out a survey in Northern Albania and efforts were limited to the 
area of the so-called security triangle of Elbasan–Tirana–Durrës. Today (four years later), the 
situation has improved a great deal. This has allowed the team to complete the plans for 
conducting a survey in Southern Albania. In the course of a week, the fieldworkers travelled more 
than 800 km along the extremely difficult mountain roads in Central and Southern Albania and 
succeeded in carrying out dozens of interviews in Tirana, Vlora, Saranda, Korça, and Pustec, as 
well as in Pogradec and the villages of Dragot, Këlcyrë and Vrbnik. 
 
 
 THE LOCAL ELECTIONS 
 
In October 2003, the recently held local elections were the major political event. Analysts 
described them as normal – having taken place in the context of a low level of electoral 
participation. The results had shown the existing balance between the two major political forces – 
the candidates of the Socialist Party had received 42 per cent of the vote and the candidates of the 
Democratic Party – 36 per cent, respectively. The lower turnout could be explained by the high 
percentage of émigrés, as well as by the voters’ withdrawal from extreme politicisation. A 
comparison with the preceding elections showed a tendency towards a decrease in support for the 
ruling Socialist Party, but that was considered to be natural following a six-year rule and in view 
of the growing conflict within this party’s parliamentary group during the past several months. 
The victories won by the Democratic Party in the cities of Elbasan, Saranda, Lushnjë and Korça, 
where the Socialist Party had traditional majority in the past, were given particular importance. 
The success achieved was deemed to be the first serious breakthrough of the Democrats in Central 
and Southern Albania since 1997. 
As there is no unified system of population registration and data administration, nearly 10 
per cent of the electorate had not been registered and were not on the voter lists which necessitated 
entering their names on Election Day. This fact was used by the Democratic Party as a reason for 
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contesting the results in Tirana and some other cities thus causing a general delay in the publishing 
of the official election results by the Central Election Commission. According to Remzi Lani from 
the Albanian Media Institute, the political class in Albania had considerable problems with what 
he called the culture of losing – the non-acceptance of defeat in elections.  
A subject of intra-party commentary was the crisis in the governing Socialist Party. It was 
connected with the formation within the parliamentary group of a faction, around former Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister of foreign affairs Ilir Meta and Pandeli Majko, severely criticising the 
authoritarian style of party leader and Prime Minister Fatos Nano. Prevalent in number in the 
splinter group were young members of Parliament who wanted to introduce a new line of conduct 
and bring about the replacement of the old nomenclatura. In the opinion of people familiar with 
the subject, the contradictions between Meta and Nano were mainly associated with the parcelling 
of economic influence in the country, while political strife was only an element. As a result of 
intraparty feuding, the Premier’s ministerial nominations were rejected by his own parliamentary 
group. According to the opposition Democratic Party, the fact that the country had been governed 
for months on end by deputy ministers was non-legitimate and early parliamentary elections had to 
be considered. 
 
CORRUPTION, TRAFFICKING, AND CLANS 
 
 In the opinion of most of the interviewees, corruption in Albania had reached incredibly 
high proportions and had become a problem for the nation’s development. People mentioned as 
causes of this phenomenon both the internal socioeconomic processes and some negative factors 
linked with the transition period in the countries of Eastern Europe. As some respondents put it, 
“much of the illegal trade today goes through Albania”. Geographically, this country is the final 
gateway to Italy. Furthermore, it is the loose border security and control that make Albania a 
preferred and convenient stop for international trafficking. 
 People said that in the period of the economic embargo on Yugoslavia hundreds of petrol 
stations were built in Northern Albania within the span of only a few months, and the daily 
amount of petrol sold could meet the nation’s overall monthly needs. Despite the strict sanctions, 
every day dozens of tons of fuel were smuggled across the border through various channels, and, 
to this end, an illegal pipe-line was specially laid in the bottom of Lake Scutari. In some experts’ 
opinion, the profits from this illicit trade exceed profits in the official economy, involving at the 
same time almost half of the active population2. 
One can judge about the existence and size of profits from illegal and semi-legal business 
by the amazing scope of construction activities throughout the country. In the city of Saranda 
alone, where there was a single hotel in 1989, some fifty new hotels have since been built, two of 
which with over 2 100 beds. In Durrës, the built-up areas have reached the beach destroying the 
tropical coastal vegetation. Of course, most stunning is the scale of construction activities in the 
capital city of Tirana, filling up every vacant spot in the suburban areas. It would be naïve to 
believe that the financial resources behind this wave of unprecedented countrywide construction 
come from Albanian emigrants’ savings or from cross-border peddling, the less so from public 
servants’ salaries. In the respondents’ view, “Albania has become a world money-laundering 
place” where powerful criminal structures invest their illegal trade capital.  
A salient conclusion from the interviews has been that not only is the Albanian political 
system closely interrelated with the economy, but also that it is a function of the economic and 
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clan groupings that emerged in the 1990’s. These formations were successful in accumulating 
considerable financial resources during the embargo on Yugoslavia getting involved in illegal 
trafficking in fuel, weapons, narcotics, and humans. A widespread practice was to evade paying 
customs duties on imported goods. In the interviewees’ opinion, this was usually done with the 
assistance of customs officers and under political protection. 
A member of Parliament from the Democratic Party was categorical that every minister 
belonged to some of the big clans having monopoly over a particular economic sector. “As a rule, 
ministers are also chiefs of these same clans.” In his opinion, the most influential and 
economically powerful clans in Albania today are: the Ruchi clan, whose patron is Secretary 
General of the Socialist Party; they have monopoly over the production of and trade in building 
materials. The Duka clan run the food stuffs business. The Mayor of Durrës is one of them. The 
Andjeli clan have established control over the gas and fuel supply. The Nano clan manage the 
mobile-phone operators. A striking fact is that the economically powerful clans come from 
Southern Albania and are connected with the Socialist Party. By their structure and mode of action 
they follow a distinct subordination, one of the centres of control being attributed to the Nano clan 
ranking higher than the rest – “Nano’s the Boss”. Their major rival is the Meta clan to which 
belong ex-President Rexhep Meidani, Skender Jenushi – former deputy leader of the Socialist 
Party, and Fatos Klosi – former chief of the secret services. Similar economic clan structures exist 
in Northern Albania too. Usually, they are closely linked with the Democratic Party. In the 
political observers’ opinion, this is where one of the fundamental shortcomings of Albanian 
society lies: “the government system imposed on Albania in the 1990s was such as to serve 
directly the economic interests of the big clans thus weakening the public institutions and 
defrauding government revenue.” 
 
SOCIAL STATUS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
One of the indicators of human growth and social status is the national income level. The 
average monthly salary for those employed in the public sector and the administration is about 
€150-160, the minimum pay – €90, the average pension amounts to about €50, the maximum – 
€100. Paradoxically, given the low levels of income in this country, quite expensive cars run in the 
streets, the most preferred brand being Mercedes. As put by a respondent, “an Albanian wouldn’t 
count as a car anything but a Mercedes”. Unlike four years earlier, when the number of vehicles in 
Albania was small and the drivers, ever so happy with their new acquisitions, would 
enthusiastically honk their horns to salute one another, what one can normally see today in Tirana 
are constant traffic jams. 
Among the major daily life problems experienced by the population are the ongoing 
electrical power outages. Most drastic are the power cuts in the villages, but even in the capital 
city of Tirana people live in the rhythm of imposed power curbs. By way of a protective measure 
against a dramatic rise in the price of electric power during the current winter season, about 800 
thousand individuals (nearly ¼ of the population) were supposed to get social assistance. The 
problem of accurate measurements of electricity consumption has not been adequately resolved 
either. Some of the households are equipped with watt-hour electric meters, others are not, the 
latter paying no more than a base amount of €20 a month. The high prices of electric power induce 
the households that have electric meters installed to save, while those with no such devices would 
consume power uncontrollably, especially during the winter months. 
In some urban areas there is a water regime as well. In Tirana water is available for only an 
hour in the morning, at noon and in the evening. This is a consequence of the too old water-mains 
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which have not been designed for the large consumption of the city today. One of the election 
promises of the old new mayor of the capital has been that by the end of his new term of office 
“water will be available round the clock”. 
Another troublesome subject is the road problem. Roads are in very poor condition, in 
some places there is no pavement at all. The Vlora – Saranda stretch turned out to be especially 
difficult for the team. The building of new roads has proceeded at a relatively slow pace. We noted 
that now, four years later, the much talked about Corridor 8 project was still at an initial stage of 
construction. A new road segment has been built from the border checkpoint at Kakvil to 
Gjirokastër.  
Because of the reduced passenger flow from Bulgaria, the direct bus line Tirana – Sofia 
has been cancelled. Small retailers that used to be its chief customers have already become rich 
enough to use mostly their own transport. 
The past years have seen social differentiation growing deeper. One of the interviewees 
gave the following example by way of illustration: “the rich in Albania are now 10 per cent – they 
speak over mobile phones, while the rest of the people talk to themselves”. A café owner in Vlora 
complained of people’s low incomes which had made many establishments close up. The decrease 
in the number of customers was also caused by the high percentage of emigrants (predominantly 
young people) from the city itself. He, too, intended to close up his café not only because of the 
lack of clientele, but also because he was afraid of being robbed or killed. He wanted to get away 
from Vlora and emigrate to America. 
An Albanian from Gostivar told us that during the recent years the ethnic Albanians in 
Macedonia had been developing active trade relations with Albania. He himself was selling stone-
crushers used in gravel production. Entrepreneurs in Gostivar had opened many confectioneries in 
Elbasan, Tirana and Durrës. Comparing the economic conditions, our Albanian interlocutor 
described the business relations with Kosovo as the most promising and reliable ones. In his 
opinion, the current situation in Macedonia is peaceful, but there is much uncertainty concerning 
the future of this state. Conditions in Albania were seen as improving, though much was still 
needed to be done in terms of infrastructure. On hearing that we planned to travel around Southern 
Albania, he was horrified and admitted that he himself would not risk undertaking this route. The 
problem comes not only from poor roads, but also from fears concerning safety. Although the 
present situation in Albania is incomparably calmer, Albanians still avoid making trips in the 
countryside, anywhere far from the big cities. 
In Vlora, the team talked with the former city prefect, now director of a brewery. We 
learned that a local businessman had invested 15 million euros in the plant’s construction. During 
our visit there, the newly purchased machines and installations were being fixed in the spacious 
shops. The production process was intended to be fully automated, and the product quality to be 
monitored by a laboratory in Germany. The management of the brewery had ambitions to put on 
the market a new brand of beer, named after the investor Argon, but spelled backward – “Nogra”. 
What shocked the team most, however, was the architectural design of the administrative building. 
In its exterior, it is a multi-storey modern edifice, with rows of sculptures of young girls, boys, 
eaglets, and lion cubs mounted on the flat roof. Still greater was the team’s surprise when we 
entered the building: instead of the customary desk places, before us were large offices supplied 
with modern office furniture, computers, luxury leather armchairs and reproductions of works of 
Rubens, Renoir, Caravaggio, Dali and the like. The central lobby was designed after the fashion of 
luxury hotels – there were clocks hanging on one of the walls, telling the exact time in the big 
capitals round the world. 
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The special attention given to this episode is not accidental. In the first place, the case of an 
ex-politician, now manager of a brewery, is indicative of the natural government-to-business 
transformation that occurred in the beginning of the transition period in Albania. At various levels, 
the power-business/business-power symbiosis has already established a solid and indissoluble link 
and has formed the backbone of the Albanian economy. Of interest is also the architectural 
representation of the environment. It is a particularly exciting experience for a researcher 
travelling in Albania to see the alternating sights of strangely mixed architectural styles, bleak 
buildings with peeling walls built during the socialist period, and next to them renovated or newly 
constructed mansions with bright-coloured fresh-painted facades, fashionable hotels and small 
private castles representing bizarre designs based on heterogeneous conceptions. The ambition has 
been to have something different from the old way and, if possible, to have every bit of everything 
– drawing lavishly on world examples. And, suddenly, there it is - a fresh masterpiece, a brewery 
with elements of classic, of baroque, with sculpted figures and ornaments, with an art gallery – all 
that suggesting vanguard aesthetics of the work place. The aim has been for art and luxury to 
become an inseparable part of business. Obviously, the long years of total isolation have produced 
a strong hunger for variegating socialist bleakness by including new elements, by experimenting 
with different styles, very often producing some really shocking patterns – entirely in the fashion 
of the modern so-called “gangster baroque”. 
 
 
THE AGRARIAN REFORM 
 
In contrast to the rest of the East-European countries, Albania’s agrarian reform of the 
early 1990s counted on the principle of egalitarianism – each individual was supposed to get an 
equal share of the land. The underlying reasons for this approach resided in the fact that before its 
nationalisation the land had been owned by only several hundred big landlords, while the vast 
majority of the rural population were just tenant farmers. The aim of the agrarian reform carried 
out in the beginning of the 1990s was to give land to all peasants while observing the principle of 
“the land belongs to those who till it”. Based on the number of adults, the arable land pertaining to 
the domain of each village was parcelled into equal-value plots and each family, depending on the 
number of its members, was given the corresponding amount of land. So, parallel with the 
transformation of the state-owned lands into privately owned ones, the reform sought to put all 
farmers on an equal footing allowing the harmonisation of agrarian relations. The process of farm 
land privatisation was more or less complete by 1995 when 95 per cent of the agricultural land 
became private property3, and the results were soon felt – the production of almost all agricultural 
crops experienced considerable growth. 
Of interest, in connection with certain problems in agricultural development, are some data 
published by Albanian sociologist Artan Fuga in the metropolitan newspaper “Koha jona”. In his 
view, ten years after the onset of the agrarian reform, some regional problems began to surface 
more clearly. Because of the poorer quality of the soil and the local climate characteristics, yields 
in North-eastern Albania and the mountain areas are much lower. The land in those parts has been 
parcelled into very small plots preventing the efficient use of mechanised equipment. During the 
team’s first expedition to Albania in 1999, the common sight would be the ploughing of the land 
using draught animals and the wide application of manual and inefficient labour. The growth of 
regional differences has also been determined by the entire lack or the poor quality of roads. 
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IMIR, 2000, p. 230. 
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Under socialism, the state used to make investments mainly in the fertile lowland areas and this 
practice has been going on to the present day. All these circumstances have provoked certain 
tension between people living in the highlands and those inhabiting the lowlands. According to the 
research data presented by Fuga, only 10-15 percent of the agricultural produce from the mountain 
regions is sold on the market, the remaining part is consumed by the producers’ households. This 
deprives farmers of motivation to develop production. It is much better for a family to send its 
younger members to work in the large cities or abroad rather than keep them on the farm.  
  
MIGRATIONS – EMIGRATION 
 
Over the past 13 years, Albania has experienced unprecedented internal and external 
migration of the population. With the fall of the communist regime, the severe restrictions on the 
freedom of movement were eliminated. The economic crisis, the mass closure of loss-making 
state-owned enterprises and the drastic shrinking of the labour market brought about in the early 
1990’s an avalanche of migration of the population from the rural areas towards the larger cities. 
The capital city of Tirana became a particularly attractive place with its most dynamically growing 
economy. Within only five years (from 1993 to 1997) its population increased from 242 000 to 
568 758 inhabitants4. In our previous study (1999) this phenomenon was often described by the 
respondents as an “invasion”. The local urban residents felt definite resentment towards the new-
comers. Some adherents of the Socialist Party would even blame Sali Berisha for deliberately 
populating the capital with scores of thousands of his followers from Northern Albania. 
On the principle of the pendulum, following the long years of Albania’s isolation and total 
exclosure during the communist regime, nowadays Albanian society demonstrates certain over-
openness. A new and particularly important circumstance for Albanians today is the possibility to 
emigrate. In the beginning of the 1990s, in an absolutely spontaneous urge, and very often in an 
act of despair, they were heading en masse towards either Greece or Italy. Despite the lack of 
accurate statistics, observations have shown that the percentage of economic emigrants from 
Albania is among the highest in Europe. Experts estimate their number to be between 500 
thousand5 and 1 million.  
The surveys we carried out have made it possible to distinguish two major migration waves. The 
beginning was set in the summer of 1991 – a month after the Albanian Labour Party (later 
renamed The Albanian Socialist Party) won the parliamentary elections. Driven to utter despair by 
their thwarted expections of political changes, the Albanians swarmed into the port cities with the 
intention of leaving the country. The lights of the Italian ports Bari and Brindisi became a dream 
for tens of thousands who risked their lives absolutely determined to reach the “opposite shore or 
get drowned and sink to the sea bottom”. Others headed for the Greek border with the purpose of 
trying to cross into Greece illegally.  
A characteristic feature of this first emigration wave was that it took place under extreme 
circumstances. One of the participants said he could not even call his family when he decided to 
start for the border in order to cross over into Greece. Desperation caused by the dire living 
conditions had reached its ultimate point of endurance and even the smallest incidence was 
sufficient to trigger off a mass exodus. As put by a respondent, “the communists had driven us to 
the point of dreaming about fleeing our own country”. A specific aspect of the first wave of 
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emigration was the involvement of men alone. The intention of most of them was to work for 
several years abroad and return to Albania with the money earned.  
In 1995-1996 there was a process of return of emigrants who invested the money they had 
made in the construction of houses, new shops and restaurants. It was a period of dramatic 
economic upsurge and a rapid improvement in the standard of living. According to a group of men 
from Vlora, it used to be quite common for a person to have “2000 [Deutsche] Marks for pocket 
money”. Data on the national economic indicators in the first half of the 1990s fully confirm the 
respondents’ accounts. Especially remarkable was the rate of growth of the national income – it 
ran up to 9.3 – 9.6 per cent in 1993 and 1994, to reach the record level of 14 per cent in 19956. 
All that lasted till the collapse in 1997 of the so-called fraudulent pyramid investment 
schemes, in which most people lost their life savings. The drastic impoverishment of the 
population generated a second large wave of emigration. Nearly 1 million people fled the country. 
In order to limit the uncontrollable influx of immigrants, the Greek authorities concentrated 
additional gendarmerie force along the Albanian border. The lack of official statistical data makes 
it difficult to establish the exact number of émigrés, and, yet, the research team succeeded in 
obtaining some fairly accurate percentages: Krujë – 21 per cent; Vlora – 50 per cent; Saranda – 50 
per cent. Korça – 32 per cent, the village of Dragot – 30 per cent. In spite of the tendency to 
occasionally exaggerate the number of emigrants, the information collected shows that those who 
have left the country account for between 20 and 25 per cent of the population. In Italy alone, the 
Albanian students are already 8 000, as many as they are in Tirana.   
The different thing in the second wave was that entire families became emigrants, with the 
aim of settling in the new place. Many of them had completely lost their confidence that it was 
possible to build a normally functioning state in Albania. At the same time, their ties with the 
relatives left behind remained very strong – some of the money earned was regularly sent home, 
new houses were built. This has put the emigrants in a specific position – on the one hand, they are 
making every effort to obtain permanent residence abroad, they send their children to Greek and 
Italian schools, but, on the other hand, they also feel obliged to maintain contacts with their 
kinfolk back in Albania. According to estimates by economic experts, emigrants put about one 
milliard US dollars into the Albanian economy each year. 
 
THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH – THE TWO FACES OF ALBANIAN IDENTITY 
 
The North-South differentiation has been traditional for Albania. It has been determined, 
above all, by the so-called “geographical” factor responsible for the formation of numerous 
ethnographic groups within a relatively small territory. In the course of history, two of them 
eventually incorporated the smaller ones and imposed their cultural domination – the Gegs in the 
north, and the Tosks – in the south. The borderline between these is the Shkumbin River dividing 
modern Albania into two parts, approximately equal in area. 
It is not always possible for an outside observer’s eye to discern what are the similarities 
and differences between the Gegs and the Tosks. The Albanians themselves do not like being 
divided. Very often, however, in discussions on various subjects, certain tension and even open 
resentment to some group of Albanians could be felt. As a rule, the dividing line is that of North 
and South, rather than that of particular local groups.  
Smaller subgroups, with their own specific regional features, can be differentiated within 
the larger ethnographic communities. Such are the people from Malësia (Malësori). They live in 
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the Malësia region around Lake Scutari. In the respondents’ view, “Malësori are the most 
backward of all people in the country – wild and uncivilized”. Their southern counterpart are the 
Kurveleshi living in the mountains south of Vlora, in the villages of Nivicë, Fterrës, Corraj, 
Ramicë, Vërniku, Bolena, Progonat, etc. Both groups are characterised by their stern character, 
often also described as “primitive”. Some of the interviewed laid special emphasis on the fact that 
many of Albania’s national heroes are of Kurveleshi origin. Although the former live in the 
northern mountains and the latter in the southern highlands of the country, opinions of them are 
quite similar. So, along with the traditional north-south distinction, there is yet another distinction 
in Albania – that of highlands-lowlands. Widespread is the view of those living by the seaside that 
Albanians from the mountain areas are “wild”, “uncultivated”, “conservative” and governed by the 
norms of the Code, “once they live at 1700 m above sea level, they are like the Malësori and the 
Kurveleshi”. 
An attempt was made under the communist regime to reduce the cultural and economic 
differences between the individual ethnographic groups and between the North and the South. 
Conducive in this respect were also the accelerated processes of industrialisation and urbanisation 
– the concentration in the urban areas of large masses of people, members of various social and 
cultural groups. As reported by the interviewees, “in the communist times everything was mixed 
up, the communists made a Russian salad and it was difficult to speak of Gegs and Tosks any 
more”7.  
Nevertheless, some long-established stereotypes characterising the two major regional 
groups are still alive. In the respondents’ opinion, northerners and southerners are distinguished in 
the first place by their dialect – “you can tell right away whether you’re talking to a Geg or a 
Tosk”. Anthropologically, people from Northern Albania are taller (Dinaric type), they have 
strongly marked features and a stern look, while those from the South are shorter (Mediterranean 
type), with more delicate facial appearance. “In the south, they sing without accompaniment, but 
in the north they always sing to the accompaniment of çifteli”. Quite common is the view that 
Tosks are “more educated – most of the intellectuals, men of the arts, and politicians come from 
the South”, while Gegs are said to “have always been soldiers – people of honour”. In economic 
terms, the South has developed more dynamically and has dominated over the North – the vastest 
and most fertile plains and the large seaside urban centres are located there. Besides, Tosks have a 
large immigrant community in Italy with whom they maintain close contacts. All these 
circumstances make them “more open to the world”. Gegs are described as “more conservative 
and uncommunicative” – “they live in small mountain villages and remote tribal hamlets”. Gegs 
point out as their advantage the fact that the Code of Lek Dukagjin is part of their cultural 
tradition, while it is only little known in the south. Southerners argue back that the standard 
contemporary language has been developed on the basis of the southern dialects. 
Historically, the relations between the two regions have been characterised by a constant 
rivalry for domination. Thus, for example, during World War II the guerrilla squads of the 
Communist Party had an active role in the southern parts, while the nationalists were dominant in 
the north. Collaboration of the chiefs of the northern clans with the German occupation authorities 
was used as a pretext for the offhand imposition of communist power in the autumn of 1944, an 
act associated with mass killings. Some contemporary studies point out that the guerrillas 
exterminated just about 1/3 of the adult male population in Northern Albania8. During the 
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following years, thousands of people were sent to labour camps or interned to other parts of the 
country. 
 One of the contemporary “projections” of regional antagonism can be perceived in the 
multi-party system established in the 1990s. The nation’s two most influential political parties 
were differentiated on geographical rather than on ideological grounds. Based on the strong anti-
communist sentiments, the Democratic Party gained support in Northern Albania, while the 
Socialist Party (successor of the former Communist Party) preserved its traditional influence in the 
South.  
As reported by the respondents, under Sali Berisha the southerners were completely ousted 
from the key public offices and replaced with people from the North. The victory of either the 
Democratic Party or the Socialist Party was in fact the victory of the North or the South, 
respectively, the triumph of some clans or others, ensuing reshuffles in the public administration at 
all levels. Thus, political life in Albania was involved in a vicious circle periodically nourishing 
the traditional regional rivalries. Based on this division, the turbulence in the autumn of 1997 was 
perceived, in a sense, as “a revolt of the South against the rule of the North”. There were even 
appeals by activists of the Democratic Party for the formation of armed troops of the North in 
order to bring under control the riots in Vlora and the other southern towns. Albania was faced 
with the danger of a civil war which could not only deepen the gap between the North and the 
South, but also result in the actual break-up of the country.  
Among the factors determining people’s rising discontent were the spreading rumours that 
the entire network of pyramid schemes was run by the secret police backed by the then Prime 
Minister Sali Berisha. The country was flooded with mass protests and looting. In the course of 8 
months chaos was complete – no police and no administration in place. In response to the 
insecurity and pillage, the population began mass seizure of weapons from the military depots in 
order to be able to defend themselves. An example of an extraordinary civic consciousness was 
given by some of the History Museum personnel in the town of Korça who drove along a tank to 
protect the building during the riots. In the end, the crisis was overcome – the desire to keep the 
state’s integrity prevailed in Albania’s society. Not least in importance was the political elite’s 
interest - although actively capitalising on the existing discrepancy between the North and the 
South, the elite’s immediate concern was to preserve the integrity of the country. 
One of the aftermaths of these events was that the Albanian population armed themselves 
on a mass scale. The repeated campaigns organised by the government in an effort to buy up the 
weapons seized from the depots, achieved only limited success. Even to date, a considerable 
amount of this weaponry is still in the hands of the population. According to the respondents’ 
reports, there is no Albanian family out of possession of at least one or two assault rifles. The fact 
was explained by the precarious times, the high crime rate, and the weak public institutions unable 
to protect the citizens in an adequate way. Yet, there is clearly something else beneath this 
development too. The requirement for every man to possess some kind of weapon has deep roots 
in the Albanian tradition – it symbolises his independent spirit and capability of defending his 
family honour. Under socialism, for nearly half a century, the right to arms possession was taken 
away. In 1997, however, chaos and banditry opened up the opportunity for most Albanians to have 
their own guns again. Paradoxically, even women who had never before touched an automatic 
weapon, told us how thrilled they had been firing an entire cartridge in the air – “just like that, out 
of joy”. Unlike the way things were in the past, when guns used to be prominently displayed, 
occupying the most conspicuous position in the house – hanging on the wall by the fireplace, 
today they are hidden and taken out only when necessary or on festive days. 
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The 1997 events have shown that regional antagonism in Albanian society, especially in a 
period of crisis, could rapidly re-activate the old rivalry stereotypes. At the same time, in 
consequence of the dynamic migration processes witnessed in the recent decades, the significance 
of this opposition has considerably decreased. Nowadays, almost 2 million people, out of a total 
population of 3.5 million, live in the central parts of the country. In demographic terms, the 
influence of Northern and Southern Albania is already very small. In contrast to the widespread 
view of the North-South dividing line, political scientist Remzi Lani launched the thesis of the 
new integrating role of “Central Albania, no Gegs, and no Tosks”. The population in those parts is 
mixed and to a lesser extent influenced by the cultural and political differences underlying the 
confrontation between the two Albanian peripheries.  
 
 
 ÇAMS  
 
One of the objectives of the survey was to establish to what extent the Çam population 
group, a community on which there were rather contradictory reports and which had been the 
subject of various political speculations had been preserved 9. Today the Çams are compactly 
settled in the municipalities of Komispol, Markat and Ksara (Southern Albania) and in Filiates 
(Greece). In relatively large groups, some of their descendants have also resettled in the towns of 
Saranda, Vlora, Fier, and Durrës. A distinctive characteristic of Çams, according to the 
interviewees, is their stronger religiousness and the observance of the Ramadan fast. When 
introduced, “they say their family name first and next their given name”. Widespread is the view 
that Çams are “very hard-working”, that they are chiefly engaged in business and are wealthier 
than the rest of the Albanians. We often heard the statement that “there’s no such thing as a poor 
Çam”. Those living along the coast are engaged in fishing and in transportation services – they 
live in a separate quarter in the city of Vlora10.  
During the last few years, there was quite a stir about the issue of Çam claims for restoring 
their ownership of estates abandoned during World War II in Greece. The reason for their fleeing 
to Albania en masse in the autumn of 1944 is to be found in the accusations of collaboration with 
the fascist occupation forces. Faced with the pending threat of acts of bloody retribution, several 
dozen thousands of families fled the country together with the withdrawing German troops. The 
lands owned by some 1700 Çams accused of collaborationism were confiscated by the Greek 
government. Exposed to constant pressure and threats until 1946, almost all Muslim Çams, 
constituting about 90 per cent of this population, emigrated. The legal status of their abandoned 
properties, however, remained unsettled. Fifty years later, their successors believed it was their 
right to be restored to ownership of their ancestors’ lands.  
In the beginning of the 1990s, seeking a wider international response, the Democratic Party 
brought a claim against Greece for the resoration of Çams’ estates in Epirus, a claim which the 
Greek side left without any answer. Later, the Socialist Party suggested that the problem be 
resolved by means of pecuniary compensation. The Greek side countered with a claim for money 
compensation in return for the nationalised Greek-owned properties in Albania. During the 
ongoing dispute, each side began to present its own data on the number of Çams: according to the 
Greek authorities, they were about 80 000 persons, while according to the Albanian authorities 
their number was about 500 000. The figures cited were absolutely arbitrary, not based on any 
                                                     
9 For further historical and demographic data see: Zhelyazkova, A. Albanian Prospects. Fieldwork. – In: Urgent 
Anthropology, Vol. 2, Sofia, IMIR, 2003, pp.  202-209. 
10 The respondents’ estimates are that the number of Çam residents in the city is about 35 thousand. 
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statistical surveys but rather seeking a suggestive impact. The team members repeatedly heard 
statements made by different politicians, not only in Albania, but also by representatives of 
Macedonia and Kosovo, who were apparently delighted to give plainly inflated figures about the 
number of Çams in Greece and who were gloating over the neighbouring nations’ fear of the rapid 
growth of the number of ethnic Albanian population. For the Albanians, “it’s people’s number that 
determines everything”. Some of them even go so far as to draw a parallel and claim that 
“Çameria could become a second Kosovo”11. In response to the overstated and apparently 
unrealistic data on Çams presented by the Albanian side, the Greek side reports similarly inflated 
and unreal figures concerning the Greek minority in Albania. As a result, the problem of the 
property and number of Çams has been directly linked with the property and number of Greeks in 
Albania. According to the team’s approximate estimates, today the Çams living in Albania must 
be around 120-150 thousand12.  
Until now, all attempts to find a political solution to the dispute have failed. The issue has 
been drawn into the sphere of political speculations and is, therefore, only destructive to the 
bilateral relations. Many of the interviewees think that the question should be referred to an 
international court which should rule independently on this controversial case. The Albanians 
believe that (kept in the archives) in Turkey are the old title-deeds certifying Çams’ land 
ownership and this circumstance is to be used as a key argument.  
 
 
BETWEEN TRADITION AND MODERNITY – THE PLACE OF CUSTOMARY LAW  
 
One of the challenges to Albanian society is how a tradition involving a number of 
medieval elements will be woven into the modern standards. For centuries on end, in the 
mountainous areas difficult of access, customary law played the part of an alternative, even sole 
institution, symbolising not only a particular way of life, but also the actual independence of the 
population. Albanians have found in its rigid rules the fundaments underlying their unique spirit 
and their strong sense of honour.  
In its most widespread version, customary law has been known as the kanun (code) of Lek 
Dukagjini – after the name of the feudal lord Lek III Dukagjin (1459-1479). It has not been 
preserved in its original version. In the early 20th century the Franciscan priest Shtjefën Gjecov 
collected and published some customary law rules applied by the Albanian mountain dwellers near 
Shkodra13. The edition included moral norms and rules regulating social and interpersonal 
relations. Its key points were: keeping personal and family honour, collective responsibility, the 
pledge (besa), and blood revenge. Along with the Code of Lek Dukagjini known from the Shtjefën 
Gjecov edition, in some parts of Albania the memory of some other versions of customary law 
codes has been preserved such as the Kanun of Skanderbeg in the regions of Debar and Mat. Near 
Vlora and Tepelena in Southern Albania, in the Labria region, still living is the memory of a local 
variant of the Code different from that of Lek Dukagjin’s. Among the Kurveleshi, the so-called 
Code of Zuli (kanuni Zulit) was applied. It is quite possible that other local variations and versions 
have existed, the memory of which has already faded out or has been completely lost.  
The communist regime of Enver Hoxha undertook drastic measures for eradicating 
customary law. The subject of kanun was banned and, instead, the socialist legal system was 
implemented. The aims of this tough and uncompromising policy were two: to obtain full control 
                                                     
11 Сп. Балканите+. Албанският национален въпрос. Брой 23, декември 2002 г., с. 16. 
12 Zhelyazkova, A. Albanian Prospects…, p. 209. 
13 Gjecovi, St. Kanuni i Lëke Dukagjinit. Skoder, 1933. 
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of the population hitherto accustomed to an independent status (untouched by anyone’s authority), 
as well as to overcome the utter primitiveness and cultural isolation of the highlanders. 
One of the paradoxes of contemporary Albanian society is that in spite of the very long 
period of total restriction, the spirit of customary law has not completely lost its influence. With 
the fall of the communist regime, customary law norms rapidly found a medium for new 
development. In the Albanians’ view, the revival of the Code has been a reaction on the part of 
society to social insecurity, inefficient laws, the weak state and the high incidence of criminality. 
In the emerging legal and social void of the early 1990s, people would ever more often refer to 
customary law norms for resolving the concrete cases of their daily interrelations. As a result, 
older feuds were resumed and hundreds of new ones were triggered off. Paradoxical as it may 
sound, in the late 20th and the early 21st century Albania was yet again faced with the nightmare 
of vendetta which threatened the safety and the lives of tens of thousands of men and children 
dooming their families to constant fear and economic ruin. 
The largest number of blood feuds is present in Northern Albania where tradition is deep-
rooted. In order to survive, many of the endangered families seek to escape by moving to other 
towns in Central and Southern Albania, or even abroad. The number of feuds in Southern Albania 
is lower and often has no direct relation to the prescriptions of the Code. In general, these feuds 
are actually rivalries between competing criminal structures. Having gone beyond the rules of 
customary law, they are much more difficult to put under control, and the conciliatory approach 
provided by the Code most often proves to be inapplicable.  
We can conclude that blood feuds rise to the surface especially in times of “crisis” in 
society, when the public institutions are too weak to manage the deep-going and dynamic social 
transformations. Coming as a natural alternative to the “missing state”, the rules of customary law 




‘THE RELIGION OF ALBANIANS IS ALBANIAN-NESS” 
 
A distinctive feature of contemporary Albanian society is its high level of religious 
tolerance. Against the background of the severe ethnic and religious clashes seen in the Western 
Balkans during the past years, this sounds truly astonishing. Many of the respondents explained 
the phenomenon with the rigorous religious restrictions imposed during the communist regime. In 
1967 Albania was proclaimed to be the first atheist state in the world. Under a special law, the 
religious institutions were suspended, their property confiscated, and the places of worship were 
converted into sports halls, shops, holiday rest homes, or simply destroyed14. Fear of persecution 
was so strong that within the lifespan of a generation religious practices were entirely abandoned. 
Some important historical prerequisites were also conducive to the formation of certain 
indifference to religious doctrines in the Albanians. Even the Code of Lek Dukagjin itself 
specially mentions that the church is a separate institution from the commune15, and the priest is 
not allowed to take part in the assemblies of the village commune even when they are held in the 
church yard. In one of Skanderbeg’s instructions to his son Gjon Kastrioti, too, stress is laid on the 
necessity of a distanced attitude to the church institution and on brooking no interference in 
                                                     
14 Eldarov, S. Eastern Orthodox Christians and Roman Catholics in Albania. – In: Albania and the Albanian Identities. 
Sofia, IMIR, 2000, p. 102. 
15 Used is the Macedonian translation of the Code by Kim Mehmeti: Канонот на Лек Дукагини. Тетово, “ФИ&ГА”, 
1994, p. 23. 
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politics16. This theme was given special place in the works of the great national poet Pashko Vasa. 
His legendary motto, “Rise, Albanians, wake up from your sleep, all like brothers pledge to one 
religion, and mind neither church, nor mosque, the religion of the Albanians is Albanian-ness.”17, 
became a slogan of the Albanian revival. This definition of Albanians’ religion is of key 
importance for the understanding of a unique characteristic of the Balkans, namely, the peaceful 
co-existence of three religions – Islam, Eastern Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism.  
On the other hand, the inaccessible mountains were the reason why none of the religions 
imposed by external pressure succeeded in taking deep root in the Albanian mind and soul. As 
Fernand Braudel wrote, “the mountain world as a whole was only remotely committed to the 
dominant religion of the sea”18. A mountain is a world that has always stayed apart from 
civilisation, preserving its own specific spirit. With the Albanians, tradition (in the form of 
customary law) has often had the significance of both law and religion, sometimes wholly 
substituting religious rules imposed from outside. Remarkably, this tradition has proved to be so 
resilient that neither Christianity, nor Islam, nor even the regime of Enver Hoxha, could erase or 
replace it. Even today, when the rules of the Code have to some degree been obliterated, its spirit 
could be found in a whole range of behavioural patterns. It seems the Albanian has been cradled in 
these prescriptions and bears them as part of the genetic code. If you ask a contemporary Albanian 
whether he knows and observes the Code, the most frequent answer will be that its rules have 
already lost their significance for the young people. And immediately after, he will explain how 
his parents have chosen him a wife (in conformity with the Code rules), assert that if someone 
kills, he should be paid back in blood – “blood is blood, it’s not water, blood is repaid in blood 
alone”. To the Albanians, Islam, Catholicism, and Eastern Orthodoxy are only elements of 
tradition, a historical nuance. They are built in the Albanian cultural model in a way allowing one 
to preserve the community’s unity without destroying one’s sense of belonging to the Albanian 
ethnos.  
With the elimination of all restrictions after 1990, a rapid process of reinstitutionalisation 
of religious cults began. Hundreds of new temples – mosques and churches, were built with 
funding chiefly from foreign sponsors. Especially active in this process have been the Arab 
countries, the Vatican, and Greece. In order to stimulate Catholic propaganda, Pope John Paul II 
made an official visit to Albania in September 199219. With the help of various Islamic 
organisations, scores of religious schools have been opened, and an enormous bulk of religious 
literature has been published. The world headquarters of the Bektashi order, too, are based in 
Tirana20.  
In the first years after the ban on public religious worship was lifted, people availed 
themselves of the opportunity to exercise their right in a very adaptive way. Some of them, who 
had previously belonged to the Muslim tradition, came to believe it especially “chic” to go to 
Catholic churches, because they identified these churches with “things European”21, others were 
baptised in Orthodox churches. For most of the interviewed, religion was something secondary, “a 
                                                     
16 Zhelyazkova, A. Albanian Identities…, p. 25. 
17 Vasa, P. Vepra letrare. V. I. Tiranë, 1987, f. 39. Cited after: Hristova-Beyleri, R. Myth and Reality in Albanian 
Literature. – In: Albania and Albanian Identities. Sofia, IMIR, 2000, p. 172-3. 
18 Бродел, Ф. Средиземно море и средиземноморският свят по времето на Филип II. Книга първа. София, 1998, 
с. 31. 
19 Eldarov, S. Eastern Orthodox Christians and Roman Catholics…., p. 103. 
20 In the early 20th century about 20 per cent of the Muslim population in Albania belonged to the Bektashi order. 
After the Order was banned in Turkey under Kemal Ataturk, Albania became the last stronghold of this religious 
tradition. Today most of those familiar with religious practices are gone, which makes the revival of the cult difficult  
21 Казер, К. Приятелство и вражда..., с. 135. 
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matter of personal choice and judgement”. In the conversations, the respondents usually described 
themselves as Muslims, Orthodox Christians, or Bektashi, but most often they had no particular 
knowledge of the essence of their respective religion. In this sense, the data released by the 
Vatican in 1995 stating the Catholics in Albania to be 492 021 (14.8 per cent of the total 
population), and the Orthodox Christians to number about 615 000 (18 per cent of the 
population)22, could be accepted only with the reservation that they imply populations with 
presumed religious preferences rather than believers engaged in active religious practices.   
In downtown Tirana, the research team came across a group of women dressed according 
to all strict prescriptions of the Islamic tradition, and men wearing thick waist-length black beards 
– the “Taliban” style. Against the background of the secular appearance of the other Albanians 
around, the team members presumed these were probably foreign Islamists. It turned out they were 
Albanians from the villages near the city of Shkodër who had come to attend a course held at one 
of the new Islamic schools in the capital. We pause on this particular example in order to draw 
attention to the fact that in order to spread its influence religious propaganda, in this case Islamic 
one, would most easily find vacant niches in the poor rural areas that had remained apart from 
modern tendencies and the modern value system. It is no accident that the most intensive 
processes of re-Islamicisation over the past years have been witnessed in these particular areas. 
This is a phenomenon caused by the difficulty of providing some kind of raison d'être and 
prospects for development to these more conservative communities, which have not yet crossed 
the “borderline” of modernity and feel it ever more difficult to adapt to the dynamics of 
transformations. The lack of “the future” results in turning to “the past”, already perceived as a 
super-value, and the consequence is returning to the most conservative religious forms. This 
further extends the marginalisation of these communities deepening their alienation from the rest 
of society. It may well be that in the next few decades, when the processes of re-clericalisation 
will have advanced, the idyllic “religious tolerance”, now present in Albania, will take a sharp 
turn, while the tendencies of religious confrontation will start increasing.  
 
 
THE ALBANIAN FAMILY 
 
According to Shtjefën Gjeçov, a family consisted of the people in the household. When 
their number increased, they would part and form vlazniyas (fraternities), several vlazniyas would 
form a djin (kin group) and the latter, in turn, would form fises (clans) and bajraks. All bajraks 
together formed a larger family, called a people, which shared one land and had common blood, 
common language and customs23.  
Historically, the clan system began disintegrating as early as the Middle Ages. After the 
restoration of the Albanian state, many fraternities and families found themselves living in 
different countries, others emigrated to Western Europe and the United States. All these 
circumstances led to the gradual breaking up of the old clan structures and to a certain erosion of 
patriarchal relations. 
The major changes in the structure of the Albanian family were associated with the period 
of the communist regime. Following the example of the other socialist countries, the 
modernisation of social relations became, within a short term, a priority task for the Albanian 
communists – so that one of their objectives became to eradicate the archaic patriarchal tradition 
and to create a new type of “socialist family”. The processes of urbanisation during the second 
                                                     
22 Eldarov, S. Eastern Orthodox Christians and Roman Catholics…., p. 104-105. 
23 Канонот на Лек Дукагини. Тетово, “ФИ&ГА”, 1994, с. 33 
 16
half of the 20th century largely contributed to the gradual establishment of the nuclear family as 
the basic social unit in the urban centres. Only in some of the rural and mountain areas, certain 
elements of the extended family have persisted and are still found. 
One of the most important indicators of the level of development of social relations is the 
status of women. In this respect, the communist regime in Albania pursued a purposeful policy of 
guaranteeing equality between the sexes in public life. Unlike the cases of Kosovo and Macedonia, 
women in Albania were granted much larger opportunities for participation in the spheres of 
education, science, and administration. Nevertheless, persistent in the Albanian society was also 
the conviction regarding the subordinate position of women, whose role should be limited to their 
functions within the family. Over the past years, this tendency seems to have become ever more 
dominant strengthening the impression of a growing inequality between the sexes. One of the 
team’s observations was that even in the big cities one could very rarely see women walking in the 
streets – females should in any case be accompanied by a male (a husband or a relation). The 
restaurants and cafés are full of men, while women’s attendance is very low. All this creates a 
feeling of a “male” world in which a woman’s exclusive place is the home.  
An important aspect of tradition is connected with finding a marital partner. 
“Intermarriages” (in terms of creed) in Albania are quite common and are accepted by all religious 
communities without any prejudice. As a rule, (in accordance with the Code) the head of the 
family is the one who should make the choice and give permission for a marriage. This 
requirement is explained by the desire to prevent marriages between close relatives. Before the 
engagement, it is a must to make sure there is not anyone of the other family who suffers from a 
genetic disorder. It is not uncommon for the heads of the two families to arrange a marriage 
between their children while the latter are still very young, and it is absolutely unthinkable to 
break one’s pledge. This practice is strictly observed in the villages, especially in Northern 
Albania, but it is not rare in the cities either. As prescribed by tradition, a marriage is considered 
contracted after the engagement and neither side has the right to break it off. Should the girl’s 
family go back on their word, they risk getting involved in a blood feud with the boy’s family and 
losing the bride-price paid in advance. Paradoxical as it may seem, in Albania, where the 
population is among the youngest in Europe, the possibilities for an individual’s own independent 
choice are only limited. Observing the strict prescriptions of tradition, it is very difficult to come 
to dissolving a marital union. As a rule, divorce is seen as unacceptable by both sides, each of the 
families considering it their duty to help the young couple keep the marriage. This is the major 
reason for the relatively low incidence of divorces in Albania. 
In contrast to the ethnic Albanian communities in former Yugoslavia, there has been a 
steady and clear-cut tendency in Albania itself to a drop in the birth-rate. Statistically, this process 
can be traced back to 1960 when the birth-rate was the highest – an average of 6.5 births per 
woman, dropping down to as low as 2.7 births in 199524. The reduction in the number of births is a 
complex issue. It is influenced, on the one hand, by various social and cultural factors, and, on the 
other, by purely medical ones – the legalisation of abortions25 and the wider use of contraceptives. 
In addition, witnessed during the recent years has been a tendency to an increase in marriage age – 
about 28 years for males and 23.3 years for females26. Experts explain the phenomenon with the 
high level of unemployment, the economic insecurity and the large size of emigration which stop 
young people from early marriages. In some cases, the long period of university studies is also a 
reason for delaying marriage. 
                                                     
24 Karaj, T., A. Tamo. Some Tendencies…, p. 267. 
25 Abortions were legalised as late as 1991. 
26 Karaj, T., A. Tamo. Some Tendencies…, p. 270. 
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The nation’s strongly shrunk labour market has been responsible for an ever greater 
number of women losing their jobs and being compelled to assume the role of housewives. The 
family’s priority is to have the husband employed, “because he is better paid”. This circumstance 
inevitably makes many women economically dependent on their husbands. Ultimately, they have 
begun losing their social status and their social function is limited to the family sphere alone. This 
growing tendency puts to the fore the question of the economic factors underlying women’s 
emancipation and the modernisation of social relations.  
The loss of the sense of social security and government protection after 1992 is considered 
to be one of the greatest drawbacks of the country’s democratic development. As put by a 
shepherd from the village of Këlcyrë “under communism, we had no money, but we had bread, 
and now we’ve got no money to buy bread”. On the other hand, chances to emigrate, be it 
illegally, provide new economic opportunities not only for surviving, but also for raising the 
family’s standard of living. At the same time, living outside the native land confronts thousands of 
Albanian families with the necessity of making a choice: be separated or leave the country 
together thus allowing their children to attend foreign schools. This is a process affecting nearly 
1/6 of the Albanian families, and the consequences are to be observed and analysed during the 
years to come. Many of the emigrants think that the attempts to establish a democratic and strong 
state in Albania have failed. One of them shared his distress: “Albania has no future, it doesn’t 
function as a state, people in the villages raise hashish, and the country is turning into the Balkans’ 
Columbia”27.   
In the context of a weak and “corrupt” government, the Albanian comes to seek foothold in 
the family again. The vast networks of family and peer ties by means of which each individual is 
able to find ways and channels for economic survival have been restored and reactivated. Since the 
adequate government mechanisms for protection and assistance are missing, the family has proven 
to be that Albanian institution which continues to ensure permanent and efficient protection and 









The issue of minorities in Albania is ambiguous and quite difficult to elucidate because of 
the lack of statistical data. In the latest population census, taken in 2001, there were no entries for 
ethnicity, language and religion. The official Albanian position maintains that the country’s 
population comprises 95 per cent Albanians, 3 per cent Greeks, and 2 per cent other ethnic groups 
(Wallachians, Gypsies, Macedonians, and Serbs). These data are not based on any serious studies 
and are released for propaganda purposes. It is by the specific characteristics of the Albanian 
national and religious feelings that scholars (sociologists and political scientists) explain the 
reluctance of those in power to include questionnaire items that would give information on the 
number of ethnic and religious minorities. The religious “mimicry” of Albanians has been 
historically determined and is a phenomenon known in historiography. It has been motivated by 
pragmatic reasons alone and has not been in conflict with ethnic origin. During the Ottoman 
                                                     
27 Григоров, В. Икономическите имигранти в Гърция. – В: Да живееш там, да се сънуваш тук. Емиграционни 
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period, a substantial majority of the Albanian population used to present themselves as Ottomans 
maintaining, however, their Albanian identity. Nowadays, it is a common practice for the 
Albanian immigrants in Greece to identify themselves as Orthodox believers, to be baptised in 
church and change their names in order to obtain a more favourable status in that country28. Such 
acts, however, serve strictly pragmatic purposes and do not impair the immigrants’ manifest 
affiliation to the Albanian ethnic community. 
It is the Greek, Wallachian, Romany, Montenegrin, and Macedonian communities that are 
recognised as ethnic minorities in Albania. For the present, the recognition of the Bulgarian ethnic 
minority has been deferred because of the dispute between Bulgaria and the Republic of 
Macedonia over the identity of certain groups of Slavic population. The issue is further 
complicated by the lack of stable ethnic consciousness of this population who easily change their 
allegiance to either Bulgaria or the Republic of Macedonia depending on the benefits expected.  
There is a certain discrepancy in the data concerning the number of the individual 
minorities. In principle, each country tries to present higher figures for its respective minority. 
Greece, for example, insists that its ethnic minority numbers 300-400 thousand29. Today most 
members of the Greek minority of active age live and work in Greece their aim being to obtain 
permanent residence there. Still living in the Albanian villages are mostly elderly people. On its 
part, the Greek state makes every effort to keep the ethnic Greek population back in Albania. To 
this purpose, it funds projects for building schools, production enterprises, and infrastructure. 
Irrespective of the regularly insufficient number of students in Gjirokastër, a Greek university has 
been opened in this city. In many places, new churches and chapels have been built, and a huge 
illuminated cross towers above the town of Korça – a prototype of the cross rising over Skopje. In 
spite of the special concerns of the Greek state, the chances for young people to return to Albania 
are not great. They travel back home only during the annual holidays to see their relatives, or 
during elections. A desperate attempt by the Greek nationalists to strengthen the national spirit and 
more seriously engage the population in withstanding the Greek character of particular regions 
was manifested in the provocative anti-Albanian slogans raised during the latest elections in the 
town of Himara. They have been widely discussed by the public and perceived as an attempt at 
aggravating interethnic relations. 
A focus of special attention in the study was also the Slav population identifying 
themselves as ethnic Bulgarians or as ethnic Macedonians. Three regions compactly inhabited by 
such population may be recognised in Albania: in North-eastern Albania – around the town of 
Kukësi, known as Gorens; in Central Albania – in the area of the Golo Brdo Mountains; and near 
Lake Prespa. Curiously, the three groups are isolated and do not have contacts with one another. 
They also differ in the dialects they speak, as well as in their religious faith – the Gorans and the 
Golo-Brdans are Muslims, while those inhabiting the area around Lake Prespa are Orthodox 
Christians.  
 Existing estimates with reference to the number of this population are contradictory. The 
Bulgarian side insists on a figure of about 100 000, but it is obviously quite exaggerated. The 
interviewees in our inquiry were ethnic Bulgarians from Golo Brdo, citizens of Tirana, and 
Bulgarians (Macedonians) living in the Prespa area. According to the latest census, the number of 
the population in Golo Brdo is about 8200. Ethnic Bulgarians live in the municipalities of Trebišt, 
Ostrenje, and Stebljevo: compactly in 17 villages, and mixed with Albanian population in another 
23 villages. Alive among the elderly residents is the memory of the population in Golo Brdo being 
of Bulgarian origin, as well as of the local Albanians calling them “Bugars”. 
                                                     
28 Zhelyazkova, A.  Albanian Prospects…,  p. 215; Григоров, В. Икономическите имигранти..., с. 237. 
29 According to some other estimates, the actual number of the Greeks in Albania is between 100 and 150 thousand. 
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Over the last two decades, the majority of people of active age have moved to the cities of 
Elbasan, Tirana, and Durrës populating entire neighbourhoods in compact masses30., An 
association named “Prosperity – Golo Brdo”with as many as 168 members was founded in Tirana, 
where the largest group is concentrated. A similar association was set up in Elbasan. Both 
associations engage in various cultural and educational activities; they actively support the 
sending of students to Bulgaria, and contribute to the organisation of Bulgarian language courses. 
An initiative has also been launched for the opening of a Bulgarian college in Tirana. Intensified 
cultural relations with Bulgaria play an important part in reawakening Bulgarian consciousness 
among the younger generation. Over 50 students have completed their higher education at and 
graduated from Bulgarian universities in the recent years. 
 The other group, comprising those identifying themselves as Macedonians, less often as 
Bulgarians, live in the area around Lake Prespa. This region was annexed to Albania after the 
Italian protectorate of 1921-1924 was terminated. The proximity of the border has made it possible 
for the population to keep alive the cultural ties with their co-nationals in Vardar Macedonia. In 
the 1940s Yugoslavia carried out an active policy of affiliating this population to the newly 
emerged Macedonian nation. During that period, many teachers from Macedonia were sent to the 
villages in the Prespa area, and they engaged in wide-ranging educational and propagandist 
activities.  
The proclamation of the independence of the Republic of Macedonia in 1991 paved the 
way for a more active cultural policy among the population from the Prespa region. This 
population became a key priority for two reasons: because of its closeness to the border with 
Macedonia and because of its preserved Orthodox tradition. In the height of the military conflict in 
2001, the question of the Prespan villages, inhabited by a “Macedonian” population, acquired a 
new implication. The proposal by the Chairman of the Skopje Academy of Sciences Efremov for 
exchanging territories and populations between the Republic of Macedonia and Albania received 
wide publicity.  The claims of the Macedonian side were chiefly focused on the Prespa Lakes 
region. The number of this population has been estimated at over 5000 people living compactly in 
the villages of Pustec, Ostec, Galičica, Suva gora, Golem Grad, Mali Grad, Progun, Blaca, Crnava, 
Krušja, and Vrbnik. The people in these villages speak in the Vardar region dialect, while the 
inhabitants of Vrbnik use the Kostur dialect. Today, a prevalent number of the population have 
Macedonian consciousness, and a small minority of the intelligentsia describe themselves as 
Bulgarians. This is the reason why there are two cultural societies: “Prespa”, where members are 




KOSOVO AND THE ALL-ALBANIAN PROSPECTS 
 
Invariably present in each of the team’s trips around the Balkans were the themes of 
Kosovo’s status and the all-Albanian prospects. Naturally, they were a subject of discussion in this 
Albanian expedition too. The thesis that there is no other outcome for the Albanians but 
independent Kosovo has been fully confirmed. This option is seen as the only one that could 
stabilise the Balkans and, at the same time, be a counterpoint to the fears of the neighbouring 
countries about the establishment of a single larger Albanian state. None of the Albanian 
politicians thinks that the question of a union of Albania and Kosovo is part of the agenda. What is 
more, the majority of the respondents categorically denied any such possibility. The team’s 
                                                     
30 In Tirana, the Golo-Brdan Bulgarians live in the Kodra e priftit (Popovo brdo) neighbourhood. 
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observations in Kosovo have also shown that the predominant number of ethnic Albanians 
consider the establishment of an autonomous and independent state as their major priority. The 
natural aspirations for Albania’s closer integration with Kosovo are seen as a matter of long-term 
development within the framework of the all-European integration process. 
Irrespective of the belief in the common ethnic roots with their co-nationals from Albania, 
the ethnic Albanians in former Yugoslavia have gone through a number of processes of formation 
among of their own specific ethno-cultural community and national consciousness for the past 80 
years, a development which presumes the need for an independent political course. The prospects 
for the emergence of a second Albanian state do not contradict the historical tradition. The periods 
of political unification of the Albanians were too short and transient and it was regionalism that 
prevailed in the long run.   
Furthermore, the thesis that Tirana does not function as a centre of the Albanian national 
ideology has been confirmed. As a rule, people here take small interest in any forms of 
nationalism. According to Eva Hiskaj, lecturer in Balkan history at the Tirana University, during 
the dictatorship of Enver Hoxha, it was not possible to speak of nationalism, and “in general, 
Albanians imply a different content in this concept”. Even today’s university students mix up 
nationalism with the history of the national-liberation army31. At present, the ideological centres 
which promote the all-Albanian national idea emerge exclusively in the periphery – in Kosovo and 
in Macedonia, the Albanian diaspora in Western Europe and in America proving to be especially 
influential and active. Living away from the motherland, the old-time Albanian emigrants are 
much less influenced by regional differences and confrontation. Through their eyes, the prospects 
for an Albanian national and political unification seem much more realistic. Possessing 
considerable financial resources and a sense of national commitment, they actively intervene in all 
developments within the Albanian communities in the Balkans.  
Being aware of the regional differences, either inherited from the historical past or 
reinforced by present political divisions, the Albanians of today are certainly trying to find what 
brings them closer together – their language, tradition, and customs. As put by the respondents, 
“there are certain differences between us (Albanians), but what’s more important is that we’re of 
the same blood”. Revived is also the memory implying that the Albanians from Northern Albania 
are descended from the same clans as their fellow-countrymen from Kosovo, Macedonia, and 
Montenegro.   
Discussed in connection with the subject of the all-Albanian future was the issue of ethnic 
Albanians in the Republic of Macedonia. There is a common view that Macedonian society is 
faced with a difficult test – to prove that a multi-ethnic state can exist in the Balkans, or else show 
that things will follow the path of ethnically pure states. The second option is considered to be less 
favourable because it will lead to new tensions and antagonisms between the neighbouring 
countries and, as a whole, will impede the integration of this region into the EU. 
For the Albanians, the state does not have the significance it has for the Kosovars, for 
example. In a quite businesslike manner and free of unnecessary emotions, many of the 
interviewees explained they did not mind if any of the Great Powers should protect them. 
Albanians have a pronounced respect and high regard for the big nations and states. In the past, 
these were the USSR and China, now they are the United States and the EU. Widespread is the 
wish that “Italy and Albania unite, Albania become a quarter of Italy”. Italy is an example to 
follow – the Italian TV channels are among those most preferred, and the Italian goods are 
described as being of the highest quality. We were told of an episode at a chemist’s shop: A 
woman wanted to buy a medicine produced in Italy. However, an analogous drug from Belgium 
                                                     
31 Сп. Балканите+. Албанският национален въпрос. Брой 23, декември 2002 г., с. 16. 
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was available in the pharmacy, at the same price (and with even better characteristics). Still, that 
woman insisted on purchasing the Italian drug, because she was convinced it was of the best 
quality.  
The Albanians’ special attitude to Italy has been noticed by other researchers too. In this 
connection, Petar Chaulev writes: “there are Serbophobes in Albania, there are Graecophobes, but 
no Italophobes”32. This special attitude was also manifested during World War II, when the 
Italians came as occupiers, but were nevertheless welcomed by the native population. In turn, the 
Italian occupation authorities were actively engaged in the development of the Albanian economy. 
Many of the public and government buildings in the central part of Tirana date from this period. 
As an Albanian said, “out of a village, such as Tirana was, the Italians made a city”. Still living is 
the memory that the Italians did never keep distance from the Albanian population, but rather 
treated them with respect, in contrast to the Germans. After Italy’s capitulation, many Italian 
soldiers found shelter and refuge from the Vermacht troops in Albanians’ homes. Against this 
historical background, it is hardly by chance that nowadays the country’s major trade and 
investment partner is Italy again. 
 The dozens of interviews conducted and the possibility to travel in the Southern Albanian 
parts has made it possible for the team to come up with a more comprehensive picture of the 
ongoing processes. It may well be said that the country is developing with an extraordinary 
dynamics and is now rushing to make up for the delay in its social development. Naturally, 
Albania has not evaded a high incidence of criminal acts and a growing illegal trafficking, which, 
as a matter of fact, are developments characteristic of Eastern Europe in general. However, their 
forms here are more aggressive, and the criminal groupings are much more influential because of 
the weak government institutions. The dispersion of Albanians to Albania’s neighbouring 
countries and their extreme mobility are further contributing to the organisation of illegal 
trafficking. 
Counting mainly on intrafamily mutual support, Albanians do not feel any particular 
affinity to their own state. What they are emotionally attached to is their native place and their kin. 
This is both an advantage and a drawback. Albanians are very active in their quest for various 
opportunities for personal prosperity without expecting much from the state. At the same time, 
their distanced attitude does not contribute to strengthening the authority of public institutions and 
allows the establishment of powerful clan and economic structures functioning as a state within 
the state. 
Present are conditions for overcoming the traditional North-South division. In periods of 
crisis, however, the old stereotypes of confrontation may easily be revived. The political parties 
themselves play a particular role to this effect.  Formed largely on a regional principle, it is quite 
convenient for both major parties in this country to maintain and use this confrontation for 
political purposes. 
Following the long-lasting total isolation of Albanian society during the communist 
regime, the subsequent “shock-like” opening of the country has caused significant shifts in the 
social layers which are now trying to find their new place under conditions of ruthless 
competition. This reflects, above all, on the extreme dynamics of the economic and migration 
processes, on the vigorous nationwide construction activities – an unceasing rat race for new 
breathing space, economic resources, and power. 
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